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The State and Industrial Arbitration in the
United Kingdom
W. F. Frank*
The purpose of this article is to describe the arrangements
made by the state in the United Kingdom for the settlement of
industrial disputes, to discuss the reasons for the present dis-
satisfaction with these arrangements and to make some tenta-
tive suggestions for their improvement. Where possible, com-
parisons with American practice will be drawn, though it must
be appreciated that in view of the basically different attitude of
the state in the United States to arbitration such comparisons
are not always easy or indeed relevant.
I.
The intervention of the State in industrial disputes is not a
recent development in the United Kingdom. The Statute of Ap-
prentices, 1562,1 had already directed Justices of the Peace to
fix wages at their Easter sessions taking into consideration "the
plenty and scarcity of the time and other circumstances." The
Justices were also instructed to inquire twice a year into the ob-
servation of the prescribed rates. For the next two hundred
and fifty years the Justices remained the main organ through
which Parliament attempted to secure industrial harmony. The
further developments up to the end of the nineteenth century
have been described so often and so well that no good purpose
would be served by going over this well-tilled ground. The main
purpose of the author is to discuss those enactments which are
still of practical importance today or which are needed to under-
stand the trend of development in the field of industrial arbi-
tration.2
*Dr. jr. (Prague), M.Sc. (Econ.), B.Com., LL.B. (London). Senior Lecturer,
Department of Commerce and Economics, Derby and District College of Tech-
nology, England. Editor of the management law section of the Journal of Business
Law. Formerly Editor of The Industrial Law Review and the Industrial Informa-
tion Service.
1. 5 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
2. An excellent account of the history of industrial arbitration may be found in
AMULREE, INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION (1929) (Lord Amulree was, as Sir William
Mackenzie, K.C., the first president of the Industrial Court). Another useful
study, bringing the story up to the late 'forties of the present century is SHARP,
INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1950).
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A period of strikes in the late 1880's focussed attention once
more on the absence of comprehensive arrangements for the
avoidance of labour disputes and a Royal Commission on Labour
was set up in 1891 to investigate the problem. Its terms of ref-
erence instructed it "to inquire into the questions affecting rela-
tions between employers and employed, the conditions of employ-
er and employed, and the conditions of labour which have been
raised during the recent trade disputes in the United Kingdom,
and to report whether legislation can, with advantage, be direct-
ed to the remedy of any of the evils that may be disclosed and, if
so, in what manner." The thoroughness of the committee cannot
be gainsaid. Its report and minutes of evidence cover 67 vol-
umes. The committee was faced with the undeniable fact that
in view of the growing strength of trade unions no imposed legis-
lative solution was possible. It also found clear evidence of the
popularity of voluntary arbitration agreements since their num-
ber had increased by leaps and bounds. The main difficulty
which had been experienced by both sides of industry in settling
their differences in an amicable fashion was the not uncommon
one of finding suitable arbitrators. It was also recognized that if
a third party would intervene at an early stage of a dispute with
an offer of mediation, many a protracted dispute could be avoid-
ed. After all the effort that had been put into the work of the
commission, its final report came as somewhat of an anticlimax. 8
The commission rejected the idea of compulsory arbitration and
preferred to pin its faith on an expansion of voluntary arbitra-
tion. A few members of the commission suggested that collective
agreements should be made legally binding on trade unions, but
as they realized that this would entail a fundamental change in
the legal status of trade unions the suggestion was not further
pursued by them. The commission proposed, however, that dis-
cretionary powers be bestowed on the Board of Trade to enable
it "to take the initiative in aiding by advice and local negotia-,
tions the establishment of voluntary boards of conciliation and
arbitration in any district or trade and further to nominate upon
the application of employers and workmen interested, a concil-
iator or board of conciliation to act when any trade conflict may
actually exist or be apprehended."
The recommendations of the Royal Commission were taken
up and were embodied in the Conciliation Act, 1896.4 This act
3. Fifth report (1894) Cmd. 7421.
4. 59 & 60 Vict., c. 30.2.-[1] (a)-(d).
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authorized the Board of Trade to exercise at its discretion any
of the following powers whenever a difference existed or was
apprehended between any employer or class of employers and
workmen or different classes of workmen:
1. to "inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dif-
ference ;"
2. to "take such steps as to the Board may seem expedient
for the purpose of enabling the parties to a difference to
meet together, by themselves or their representatives,
under the presidency of a chairman mutually agreed upon
or nominated by the Board of Trade... ;"
3. "on the application of employers or workmen interest,
and after taking into consideration the ... adequacy of
means available for conciliation in the district or trade
and the circumstances of the case, appoint a person or per-
sons to act as a conciliator or as a board of conciliation;"
4. "on the application of both parties to the difference, ap-
point an arbitrator."
Although the Conciliation Act is still on the statute book, its
practical effect has been limited. The various steps which the
Board of Trade was authorized to take had been taken already
by the Board before the passing of the act so that all that had
happened was that statutory authority had now been conferred
on the Board to follow its usual procedure. One positive effect
which followed was the expansion of the Labour Department of
the Board of Trade which was eventually in 1916 split off from
the Board of Trade6 and made into a separate Ministry, the Min-
istry of Labour.7
During the first world war the need to safeguard war pro-
duction led to the passing of the Munitions of War Act, 1915.
The application of this act was restricted to specified industries, 9
namely, the manufacture or repair of arms, ammunition, ships,
5. Ibid.
6. New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916. 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 68.
7. During the second world war this ministry was renamed Ministry of Labour
and National Service.
8. 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54.
9. This limitation in the scope of compulsory arbitration resembles that of the
Kansas Industrial Court Law, 1920, which was also restricted to industries "af-
fected with the public interest." The National War Labor Board in the United
States had also jurisdiction over those labour disputes only which threatened to
impede "the effective prosecution of the war."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
vehicles, aircraft or other articles required for use in war, as
well as the metals, machines or tools required for that manufac-
ture or repair. Power was given to the minister to extend the
application of the act to other industries provided that he was
satisfied that effective means for the settlement of labour dis-
putes did not exist in the industry concerned. The act was ex-
tended in fact to cover also the employment of coal miners in
South Wales, card and blowing room operatives in Lancashire and
dockers in London, Liverpool, and Wales. Under the act any dif-
ference as, to wages, hours of work, or conditions of employment
which the parties were unable to settle themselves could be re-
ported by either of them to the Board of Trade. The Board's
duty was to promote a settlement by any means which it con-
sidered desirable. If the Board considered the dispute one suit-
able for arbitration, it could refer it to an arbitration board,
whose award was legally binding on the parties. Failure to com-
ply with the award was an offense punishable by a fine.10 Strikes
and lockouts were declared illegal unless the dispute had been
first reported to the Board and the Board had failed to take ac-
tion within a period of twenty-one days.
In the following year the Munitions of War (Amendment)
Act, 1916,11 enlarged the definition of "munitions work" by in-
cluding also industries only indirectly connected with the prose-
cution of the war. The passing of these two acts did not fully
satisfy those who complained about the delay in the settlement
of labour disputes. The Munitions of War Act, 1917,12 permitted
therefore any government department (and not only the parties
to the dispute) to report a dispute to the Minister of Labour.
The act also instructed the arbitration tribunal to which the min-
ister had referred a dispute to make its award as quickly as pos-
sible, where practicable within fourteen days. With the end of
the war the'need for compulsory arbitration was believed to have
ceased. The Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act, 1918,'13 was
passed, after consultation with employers and trade unions, with
the purpose of providing a transitional system from war to peace
conditions. The act, which was originally intended to last for
. 10. There is nothing in British arbitration procedure comparable to the en-
forcement of arbitration awards by executive action (e.g., 'by the seizure of plants)
as olerated, for instance, under the National War Labor Board system in the
United' States.
11. 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 89
12. 17-& 8 Geo. 5, c. 45.
13. 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 61.
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six months only, was later extended for another six months 14 and
expired on November 21, 1919. Apart from repealing the.pro-
,hibition of strikes and lockouts, the act also abolished the com-
pulsory arbitration of labour disputes, except for disputes as to
whether a workman was paid the prescribed rate of wages, this
being the standard rate of wages prevailing on Armistice Day.
While the war was still in progress the government had al-
ready set up a Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction: In 1916
this committee appointed a sub-committee to investigate rela-
tions between employers and employed. The chairman of this
body was Mr. J. H. Whitley, then chairman of committees of the
House of Commons, and the committee is therefore referred 'to
as the Whitley Committee. In a series of reports published in
1917 and 191815 the committee recommended some far-reaching
changes in the structure of industrial relations in the United
Kingdom. Briefly, these changes involved the setting up of
standing bodies for promoting cooperation between employers
and employed, especially in those industries where because of
organizational weaknesses on either side the normal process of
collective bargaining did not work at all or only with difficulties.
The Whitley Committee appreciated, however, that even the best
possible machinery for cooperation could not succeed in ironing
out all differences and their fourth report 16 outlined ways in
which the State could step in where failure to agree threatened
industrial peace. This was to be done by providing:
1. means by which an independent inquiry may be made into
the facts and circumstances of a dispute and an authorita-
tive pronouncement made thereon but without compulsory
power of delaying strikes and lockouts;
2. a standing arbitration council for cases where the parties
wish to refer any dispute to arbitration.
The recommendations contained in this report were embodied
in the Industrial Courts Act, 1919.17 This act consists of two
parts: the first deals with the Industrial Court while the second
is concerned with courts of inquiry.
The Industrial Court 8 is not a court of law; it is, as sug-
14. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 18.
15. Cmd. 8606 (1917) Crud. 9001 (1918); Cmd. 9002 (1918); .Cmd. 9099
(1918); Cmd. 9153 (1918).
16. Cmd. 9099 (1918).
17. 9 &'10 Geo. 5, c. 69.
18. For a brief discussion of the work of the court see Badcock, The Industrial
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gested by the Whitley Committee, a mere permanent arbitration
tribunal. The court consists of a permanent president, who has
the standing of a High Court judge, of a number of "independ-
ent" members and of members representing employers and work-
men. The president is appointed in the same way as a High
Court judge, while the other members are appointed by the Min-
ister of Labour. The court may sit in divisions, consisting in
general of an independent member (or the president) as chair-
man and representative members taken from the panels of em-
ployers and workmen respectively. The representative members
are not chosen from the industry involved in the dispute before
the court.
In order to understand the jurisdiction of the court it is
necessary to examine the definition given to "trade disputes" by
the 1919 act. A "trade dispute" is defined as "any dispute or
difference between employers and workmen or between workmen
and workmen connected with the employment or non-employ-
ment or the terms of the employment or with the conditions of
labour of any person."' 9 The same section20 described a "work-
man" as "any person who has entered into or works under a con-
tract with an employer, whether the contract be by way of
manual labour, clerical work or otherwise, be it express or im-
plied, oral or in writing, and whether it be a contract of service
or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to execute any work
or labour." The definition of "workman" is wide enough to in-
clude all employees, even those who are employed by the Crown
or by local authorities. Disputes concerning members of the
armed forces of the Crown are, however, expressly excluded
from the jurisdiction of the court. Following the procedure
which is common to all state-appointed arbitration boards in this
country, access to the court is possible only via the Minister of
Labour and National Service. The minister may refer a trade
dispute to the Industrial Court for settlement provided that both
parties agree and provided that he considers this procedure to
be suitable for the dispute in question. If, however, in the in-
dustry in which the dispute originated there exist special facili-
Court, 5 INDUSTRIAL L. REV. 104 ot seq. (1950). A historical study of the court
may be found in AiuLnan, INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION (1929).
19. It is interesting to compare this definition with that occurring in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), which defines "labor disputes"
as controversies concerning the terms, tenure and conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment.
20. Section 8.
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ties for the settlement of disputes, the minister may not refer the
trade dispute to the Industrial Court unless the special machin-
ery in the industry has been exhausted and unless both parties
agree to the reference. The minister may also refer to the court
for advice any matter arising out of or relating to a trade dis-
pute if he considers it desirable that the opinion of the court
should be obtained.
Legislation passed since 1919 has made a reference to the
Industrial Court the normal method of settlement for trade dis-
putes in certain industries. This procedure has been used par-
ticularly in respect to nationalized industries and industries
which are in receipt of government subsidies.2'
The awards of the Industrial Court are not legally binding
on the parties.22 Bearing this fact in mind, the minister will not
refer a dispute to the court if he has doubts as to whether the
court's award will be accepted by both parties since the reputa-
tion of the court would be bound to suffer irreparable harm if
a number of its awards were to be rejected by one or both of the
parties. This is, of course, unlikely to happen since a reference
to the court will not take place unless both sides have agreed to
it. Generally speaking, the stronger unions have made little use
of the facilities of the court.
Although an award of the court is not binding as such, the
award will become an implied term of the contracts of employ-
ment of the workmen to whom it applies but only if it is adopted
by the parties. In this case it could be enforced as any other con-
tractual term.
When a dispute has been reported to the Ministry of Labour,
the Ministry will first attempt through an officer of its indus-
trial relations branch to mediate between the parties and to per-
suade them to reopen direct negotiations where this is possible.
If the mediation attempt fails, the officer of the Ministry may
suggest to the parties that their dispute be referred to arbitra-
tion and if they are prepared to agree to this, he will help them
in drafting the terms of reference. If joint terms of reference
cannot be agreed upon, the claimants will present a statement of
21. E.g., the Sugar Industry Act, 1942; the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938;
the Transport Act, 1947; the Civil Aviation Act, 1946.
22. The awards are not enforceable under the Arbitration Act, 1950, as that
act does not apply to any reference made by the minister to the Industrial Court.
Industrial Courts Act, 1919, § 3.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
claim and this, together with the answer of the other party, will
take the place of agreed terms of reference.
The Industrial Court has its permanent headquarters in Lon-
don 23 where also most of the hearings will be held, but from time
to time in order to accommodate the parties hearings have been
held in the provinces as well. The court gives the parties at least
fourteen days' notice of the time and place of the hearing and
the parties are also reminded to have ready at the hearing all
the evidence which they wish to submit.
The procedure of the court is governed by the Industrial
Court (Procedure) Rules, 1920. Subject to these rules the court
may control its own procedure. The court, as has been shown
already, sits in divisions, each division consisting normally of
three members. The president may decide, however, that a dis-
pute should be heard before a single member (taken from the
panel of independent members) of the court. He may also, at his
own initiative or at the request of the parties, call in one or more
assessors to assist the court. Their function is to advise the
court on some technical issues raised in connection with a dis-
pute. While they sit and deliberate with the court and may ask
questions of witnesses, they are not members of the court and
will not sign the award.2 4
Parties may be represented by counsel or solicitor provided
the court agrees. If such permission is granted to one party it
is automatically extended to the other party as well. There is no
need to seek the court's permission if a party wishes to be repre-
sented by a lay person and the same applies also where a bar-
rister or solicitor appears for a party not professionally, but in
his capacity as an official of the organization involved.
The proceedings are conducted in as informal a manner as
possible. After the clerk of the court has read out the terms of
reference the claimant presents his case first and then produces
his evidence. His witnesses, if any, are then cross-examined by
the respondent. The respondent then presents his case and evi-
dence, and his witnesses may be cross-examined by the claimant.
Most of the evidence is written and even the statements to be
made by the witnesses are presented in written form (copies be-
ing supplied in advance to the other party), but the witnesses
23. 1 Abbey Gardens, Great College Street, Westminster, London S.W. 1.
24. The services of assessors are likely to be required in very few instances
only. AMULREE, INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION 182 (1929).
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must be present at the hearing so as to allow the other party to
cross-examine them on their evidence. The evidence of witnesses
may be taken on oath, but this is not generally done. The court
has no power to demand the production of documents or to com-
pel witnesses to attend.25 Through it is not legally obligatory,
the public are generally excluded from the hearings of the
court.
26
The court's award is given in writing and is of course limited
to the terms of reference. Though in the first years of its exist-
ence the court used to give extensive reasons for its awards, this
practice has now been discontinued . 2  The award simply recites
the claim and the arguments adduced in favour of it as well as
the answer and the arguments of the respondents and concludes
with the phrase: "The court, having given careful consideration
to the evidence and submissions of the parties, award that ..."
An advance copy of the award is sent to the parties by the sec-
retary and the award is subsequently published by H. M. Sta-
tionery Office. Unless the award fixes a particular date from
which it is to operate, it will be operative as from the date on
which it was made.
Part II of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, authorizes the
Minister of Labour and National Service to set up. a court of in-
quiry and refer to it for investigation an existing or apprehended
trade dispute. The consent of the parties is not needed for this
step, which is usually taken where one or both parties have
shown themselves unwilling to accept arbitration and where in
the minister's opinion the trade dispute endangers the public in-
terest. The court of inquiry is not concerned directly with a set-
tlement of the dispute; its main function is the ascertainment of
the causes of the dispute. The court of inquiry reports to the
minister who has to lay the report before Parliament. Frequent-
25. This corresponds to American practice. Of. UPDEGRAFF & McCoy, ARBITRA-
TION OF LABOR DISPUTES 107 (1946).
26. The procedure before the Industrial Court does not appear to differ sub-
stantially from the procedure before arbitration boards in the United States. Cf.
TORFF, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 311 (1953) ; ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
11 (1952). There does exist, however, an important difference as to the enforce-
ment of awards. In the United States the award of an arbitrator, once issued, is
legally enforceable by going into court for a motion for its enforcement. TORFF,
op. cit. supra at 314. The difference between British and American practice is
doubtless due to the fact that in the United States (unlike Britain) the Arbitra-
tion Act applies to industrial arbitration.
27. Although arbitrators in the United States generally give reasons for their
awards, there appears to exist no necessity for their doing so. UPDEGRAFF & MC-
Coy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 118 (1946).
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ly the report of the court of inquiry contains an outline of the
basis on which, in the opinion of the court, the dispute could and
should be settled. This suggestion will inevitably have a strong
effect on public opinion and it will be difficult for the parties to
disregard it. There are no general rules of procedure for a court
of inquiry. When naming the members of the court and deter-
mining their terms of reference, the minister will also outline
their powers, which may include that of summoning witnesses
and their examination on oath. The courts of inquiry have
proved very useful in dealing with "hard core" disputes not
amenable to normal arbitration procedure. Frequently, in fact,
the mere appointment of a court of inquiry has led to an imme-
diate return to work of strikers.28 It may be added that while
the minister will not refer a dispute to arbitration by the Indus-
trial Court while a stoppage of work is in progress, a stoppage
of work does not preclude the setting up of a court of inquiry.
As has been shown already, the necessities of war led to the
passing of the Munitions of War Acts in the first world war and
a similar situation prevailing in the second world war had a like
result. The Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration
Order, 1940,29 was made under powers contained in regulation
58AA of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1940,80 which,
themselves, were based on the Emergency Powers (Defence)
Act, 1939.31 The main purpose of the 1940 order was the setting
up of the National Arbitration Tribunal (to be abbreviated
as N.A.T.) which came into existence on August 1, 1940, and
which operated until October 1951 when its place was taken by
the Industrial Disputes Tribunal (to be abbreviated as I.D.T.).
The 1940 order will be discussed here in outline only as the
N.A.T. has now disappeared. The order introduced quasi-com-
pulsory arbitration in industrial disputes in that the Minister
of Labour and National Service could refer a dispute to the
N.A.T. for settlement if the dispute had been reported to him by
one of the parties. Even then the minister had the option of re-
ferring the dispute to some other body for settlement if such
body in his opinion was more suitable for the purpose. The order
provided further that an employer should not declare a lockout
and a worker should not take part in a strike unless the dispute
28. E.g., in the recent dispute between BOAC and BEA and the maintenance
workers employed by them at London airport.
29. S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 1304.
80. S.R. & 0. 1940, No. 1217.
31. 3 & 4 Geo. 6, e. 36.
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had been reported to the minister and twenty-one days had
elapsed since the date of the report without the minister having
referred the dispute for settlement in accordance with the order.
Under the Defence Regulations it was a criminal offence to or-
ganize (as distinct from a mere participation) a strike or lock-
out in breach of the above provisions.
The awards of the N.A.T. became implied terms in the con-
tracts of employment of the workmen to whom they related with-
out there existing a necessity for the parties to adopt them.
The continuance of the 1940 order beyond the period of the
war was justified by the government on the ground that the
post-war economic situation of the country constituted as much
an emergency as the war had done so that unnecessary stoppages
of work had to be avoided as a luxury which the country could
not really afford. At the same time it was recognized that the
use of compulsion in the settlement of trade disputes was some-
thing which offended against British traditions in the field of
industrial relations. The continuation of the N.A.T. was there-
fore made dependent on the consent of trade unions and employ-
ers' organization. Generally speaking, the larger unions were
getting increasingly restive, mainly because of the prohibition
of strikes while the smaller unions found compulsory arbitration
more to their liking. After lengthy discussions with both sides
of industry, the minister decided, therefore, in 1951 to replace
the 1940 order by a new one which, while retaining the accept-
able features of the old one, would also embody some of the
changes which had been pressed on the minister by the Trades
Union Congress.
The Industrial Disputes Order, 1951,82 was made by the
Minister under the same emergency powers which had author-
ized his predecessor in 1940 to make the Conditions of Employ-
ment and National Arbitration Order. The 1951 order set up
the I.D.T. to replace the N.A.T. The I.D.T. is not, like the In-
dustrial Court, a permanent body, but is constituted separately
for every dispute which is referred to it by the minister. The
minister has constituted a panel of "appointed members" and
separate panels of persons chosen to represent employers and
employees respectively and the tribunal consists normally of
32. S.I. 1951, No. 1376. The order was made by the Minister of Labour and
National Service on the understanding that it would be reviewed at once if either
side of industry wished it to be discontinued. 491 HoUsE OF COMMONS REPORTS,
c. 1626 (1951).
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three appointed members (one of whom acts as chairman) and
two. other members, one being taken from each of the "repre-
sentative" panels. All members are appointed by the minister.
Subject to the provisions of the order the tribunal may regulate
its own procedure. The tribunal may sit in as many divisions as
the minister may from time to time decide.
The tribunal has two main functions, namely to deal with
"disputes" and with "issues" referred to it by the Minister.83 .
The order states that "dispute does not include a dispute as to
the employment or non-employment of any person or as to
whether any person should or should not be a member of any
trade union but, save as aforesaid, means any dispute between
an employer and workmen in the employment of that employer
connected with the terms of the employment or with the con-
ditions of labour of any of those workmen." There exists a sub-
stantial difference between the definition of "dispute" under the
order and that of a "trade dispute" for the purposes of the In-
dustrial Courts Act, 1919. Disputes as to the reinstatement of
an employee or as to whether or not a closed shop may be op-
erated in an establishment are expressly excluded from the
jurisdiction of the I.D.T. It has also been held that while the
dispute may be one affecting one particular worker only (e.g.,
as to his grading) 34 the tribunal is not competent to deal with a
dispute where the employee in question is the only .one of his
kind employed by the employer.3 5 The definition of "workman"
is the same as used in connection with the Industrial Courts
Act, 1919.
The minister may refer a dispute to the I.D.T. for settlement
only if the dispute has been reported to him in accordance with
the order. While under the 1940 order either side to a dispute
could report it, now under the 1951 order a dispute may be re-
ported only by an organization of employers on behalf of em-
ployers who are parties to the dispute, or by an individual em-
ployer where the dispute is one between him and the workmen
in his employment or by a trade union on behalf of workmen
who are parties to the dispute. Where the dispute is reported by
33. Between 1951 and November 3, 1958, 1160 cases have been referred to the
tribunal. Of these 82% dealt with "disputes" and 18% with "issues." 595 HousE
OF COMMONS REPORTS, col. 1163 (November 19, 1958).
34. Regina v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, ex parte Queen Mary College
[1953] 2 Q.B. 483.
35. Rex v. National Arbitration Tribunal, e.T parte South Shields Corporation
[1953] 1 K.B. 46.
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an organization of employers or by a trade union, the employers'
organization -or trade union must habitually take part in the
voluntary settlement of terms and conditions of employment in
that industry (provided that there 'exists machinery for this
purpose) or where there is no machinery for collective bargain-
ing, the employers' organization or trade union must represent
a substantial proportion of employers or workmen in the in-
dustry. This limitation on the power to report a dispute was
introduced at the request of the Trades Union Congress in order
to strengthen the position of the official unions against "break-
away unions" or groups of union members dissatisfied with their
union leadership. The minister decides whether the body re-
porting the dispute is qualified to do so.
When a dispute is reported to the minister, he will refer the
dispute for settlement through the machinery for the settlement
of disputes existing in the industry where the dispute has orig-
inated, provided that such machinery exists and that it has not
yet been exhausted by the parties. If no such machinery exists
or if it has been exhausted by the parties, the minister may take
any other steps which he considers expedient in order to pro-
mote a settlement. This may take the form of a reference of the
dispute to the I.D.T.36 Such a reference should be made within
fourteen days of the date of the report of the dispute, but the
minister may extend this period if he thinks that this would be
desirable. The minister must not refer the dispute to the I.D.T.
if either party has taken steps to compel the other party to ac-
cept a settlement (e.g., by strike or lockout) and the minister
feels that in the circumstances it would be undesirable to have
recourse to arbitration. 37 If, in such circumstances, the dispute
has already been referred to the I.D.T. the minister may stay
the proceedings before the tribunal while the action continues.
Striking or calling a lockout is, however, no longer deemed to be
an offense. The parties to a dispute are free to take whatever
action they like in support of their claim, but they cannot have it
both ways; they cannot use self-help and arbitration at the same
time.
An award of the I.D.T. disposes only of the dispute between
the parties directly involved and cannot be binding on those
36. It may also take the form of a reference to the Industrial Court. The
award of the Industrial Court would in such a case be as binding as that of the
Industrial Disputes Tribunal.
• 37. A -similar principle was adopted by the National War Labor. Board in--the
United States. Cf. BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 269 (1951).
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who were not parties to it. The same applies, of course, equally
to collective agreements which, if entered into by an employers'
association, cannot be held to commit employers who are not
members of the association. The 1940 order had, however,
adopted a principle38 which was later also embodied in the 1951
order providing for the compulsory extension of arbitration
awards or collective agreements to those who were not originally
parties to them. The 1951 order lays down that where in any
trade or industry (or section thereof) terms and conditions of
employment have become established either through arbitration
or negotiation and the parties to the arbitration or negotiation
were organizations of employers and trade unions, representa-
tive respectively of substantial proportions of the employers and
workmen engaged in that trade or industry, these terms will be
known as "recognized terms and conditions of employment." It
is then possible for either an organization of employers or for a
trade union, provided that they habitually participate in the
settlement of terms and conditions of employment in that trade
or industry, to report to the minister as an "issue" the refusal
of a particular employer to observe the "recognized terms and
conditions of employment." The minister may then refer the
"issue" to the I.D.T. If the tribunal is satisfied that "recognized
terms and conditions of employment" exist in the industry and
that the employer does not observe them, nor does he apply terms
and conditions which are not less favorable than the recognized
ones, the tribunal may order the employer to observe the recog-
nized terms and conditions of employment.
This part of the order has been the one most cherished by
the unions, especially the smaller ones. The unions' tactics have
been to come to an understanding with the main employers'
association in the industry (whether directly or through arbitra-
tion) and then to compel the smaller, non-federated, employers
to abide by the same terms. The issue procedure has also on
the whole been welcome to the federated employers who feel that
in this way their unorganized competitors will be unable to de-
rive a competitive advantage from paying lower wages.
When a union or an employers' association reports to the
minister, it must be careful to distinguish between a dispute and
an issue since if it were to report an issue when it should have
38. The principle was, even in 1940, not an entirely new one. It was already
contained in the Cotton Manufacturing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1934. 24 &
25 Geo. 5, c. 30.
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reported a dispute (or vice versa) the employer in question
could obtain an order of prohibition to prevent the tribunal from
proceeding on the reference. The Court of Appeal has held"9 that
an issue is primarily concerned with whether a particular em-
ployer should accept and observe a general code of conditions of
employment established by negotiation or arbitration between
representative organizations of employers and trade unions and
covering the whole of the industry. If, on the other hand, a col-
lective agreement or an arbitration award provides for some
particular change in existing conditions (e.g., a wage increase)
the question whether a particular employer should follow suit is
a dispute as to wages, etc. In the dispute, the existence of the
national agreement is prima facie relevant evidence but no more.
An award made by the I.D.T. on a dispute or issue referred
to it by the minister will become an implied term in the con-
tracts of employment of the workmen to whom the award refers.
These implied terms are binding irrespective of the wishes of
the parties, but the parties may vary them subsequently by
agreement if they wish to do so.
The Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Revocation) Or-
der, 1958,40 has now provided that the 1951 order shall not ap-
ply in respect of any dispute or issue not reported to the minister
by December 10, 1958. The order itself will cease to have effect
as from March 1, 1959, on which day the I.D.T. will go out of
existence. The reasons for and the consequences of this change,
which will mean the end of quasi-compulsory arbitration in the
United Kingdom will be discussed in the second part of this
article.
II.
In order to evaluate the intervention of the State in the
settlement of industrial disputes in the United Kingdom, it is
necessary to start with a brief discussion of the law affecting
collective agreements. There is one noticeable difference between
collective bargaining in the United States and in the United
Kingdom and that is that while in the United States the typical
collective agreement is one between a trade union and an em-
ployer, in the United Kingdom it is one between a trade union
and an employers' association. Furthermore, at least outside the
39. Regina v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, ex parte Technaloy Ltd. [1954]
2 W.L.R. 932, 2 All E.R. 75.
40. S.I. 1958, No. 1796.
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nationalized industries, there exists no legal compulsion on em-
ployers to bargain at all with trade unions.
American legal literature has devoted considerable attention
to the question whether collective agreements are enforceable in
the courts. The doubts as to their enforceability appear to rest
mainly on the non-corporate status of trade unions. Though
British trade unions are also unincorporated bodies, the Trade
Union Acts provide that registered trade unions may sue and be
sued in their registered names. Even so, the Trade Union Act,
1871, 1 states that no action arising out of an agreement made
between one trade union and another may be entertained by a
court of law. This provision makes unenforceable all collective
agreements between trade unions and employers' associations
since an employers' association is legally covered by the defini-
tion of a trade union. Section 4 of the Trade Union Act, 1871,
does not extend to agreements made between a trade union and
an individual employer, but one authority at least 42 has argued
most convincingly that quite apart from the 1871 act collective
agreements are unenforceable since they are not contracts at
all. Professor Kahn-Freund has pointed out that a collective
agreement may contain two different types of provisions. The
"obligatory provisions" are those where the agreement imposes
certain duties on the parties directly concerned in its making,
e.g., where a trade union agrees not to submit a new claim for a
certain period or an employer accepts the principle of a closed
shop. The "normative provisions" of a collective agreement are
those which regulate the conduct of other persons who were not
directly parties to the agreement, such as the wages of the mem-
bers of the negotiating union. The normative provisions of the
collective agreement are generally more important than the obli-
gatory ones. Professor Kahn-Freund contends now that it is a
mistake to assume that trade unions negotiate as agents for their
members. 43 They negotiate on their own behalf, but not with a
view to making a contract in the legal sense of the word.
"An agreement is a contract in the legal sense only if the
41. 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31.
42. Kahn-Freund in FLANDERS & CLEGG, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 57 et seq. (1954). Kahn-Freund first expounded his
views in an article on Collective Agreements under War Legislation, 6 MOD. L.
REV. 112 (1943). Cf. Badcock,Collective Agreements, 6 INDUSTRIAL L. REV. 13
(1951).
43.This approach seems to have gained a measure of approval in the United
States. Cf. Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements under Taft-
Hartley Section 801, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 200 (1956).
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parties look upon it as something capable of yielding legal
rights and obligations. Agreements expressly or implicitly
intended to exist in the 'social' sphere only are not enforced
as contracts by the courts. This appears to be the case of
collective agreements. They are intended to yield 'rights' and
'duties', but not in the legal sense; they are intended as it is
sometimes put, to be binding 'in honour only,' or (which
amounts to very much the same thing) to be enforceable
through social sanctions but not through legal sanctions. '44
Professor Kahn-Freund chooses, therefore, to regard a col-
lective agreement as a form of private industrial legislation 45
by interested parties for the purpose of setting up an "industrial
code."'46 If this code is actually applied by a particular employer
to his employees, it will become a "crystallized custom" and will
thus implicitly be embodied in the relevant contracts of employ-
ment, giving the employees a right of action for breach of con-
tract if the employer subsequently fails to observe these terms.47
Naturally, all that has been stated here as to the indirect en-
forceability of collective agreements can apply to the normative
provisions in them only, and even they can be enforced only if
actually adopted by the parties to the agreement. 48 It is the
adoption and not the agreement which makes the provisions en-
forceable. The union has no right of action against an employer,
or an employers' association if it should fail to observe either
the normative or the obligatory provisions of the collective agree-
ment.49 The union can only apply economic sanctions to insure
compliance with the agreement. The position in the United
Kingdom appears to differ significantly in this respect from
that prevailing in the United States.50
While, then, collective agreements appear to be in one way
less effective in the United Kingdom than in the United States,
44. KAHN-FREUND, SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN
57-58 (1954).
45. Kahn-Freund's approach has been criticized by another writer. GAYLER,
INDUSTRIAL LAW 172-74 (1955). Gayler relies partly on the fact that there exists
no clear judicial authority one way or the other as well as on American practice
where collective agreements are enforceable. The very absence of any judicial de-
cision in the United Kingdom seems to point to the conclusion that enforceability
of collective agreements is not envisaged by the parties.
46. This idea is not unknown in the United States. "The process of negotiating
and administering agreements establishes the common law of the work community."
DUNLOP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 31 (1949).
47. Holland v. London Society of Compositors, 40 T.L.R. 440 (1924).
48. Hulland v. William Sanders & Son [1944] 2 All. E. R. 568.
49. Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. [1931] A.C. 83.
50. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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they are more effective in another respect. Under the system
prevailing in the United States it is unlawful in general for an
employer to refuse to recognize trade unions or to refuse to
enter into bona fide bargaining with them. The employer in
the United Kingdom may refuse to recognize a trade union' or
indeed trade unions in general and he may reject the idea of
bargaining collectively,5 2 but if he refuses to bargain and a
"code" has been set up for the industry, whether by means of
an agreement to which the parties were substantial proportions
of employers and workmen in the industry or through an arbi-
tration award given in a dispute between such parties, the pro-
visions of this "code" may be compulsorily extended to cover
him as well. Thus, in effect, the choice is not really one between
bargaining collectively or not bargaining, but rather between
being a party to a collective agreement and having the terms of
an agreement made by others thrust upon oneself.
What is the relevance of all this to industrial arbitration?
Compulsory arbitration has lasted for as long as it did in the
United Kingdom because of the very fact that collective agree-
ments are not legally binding on the parties. If they were bind-
ing, going to arbitration would be a mere alternative to going
to court, just as commercial arbitration is in a different field.
As collective agreements are not legally binding, however, the
only alternative to arbitration is strike action. Similarly, com-
pulsory arbitration is the only alternative to strike action where
an employer or an employers' association refuses to bargain with
a trade union.
The reason why compulsory arbitration is now about to dis-
appear from Britain's industrial scene follows naturally from
the reasoning used above. Compulsory arbitration as it has
worked in Britain for the last eighteen years has been a sub-
stitute for collective bargaining and now at last we have come to
the conclusion that it is an imperfect substitute. 5 The reasons
for this will be examined below:
51. In the United Kingdom there is nothing illegal in either a "yellow dog con-
tract" or in a closed shop agreement. For better or for worse Britain has no Taft-
Hartley legislation.
52. Nationalized industries have a duty to consult with representative trade
unions and to bargain with them about wages and working conditions. Cf., e.g.,
Coal Industry Nationalization Act, 1946, § 46(1); Civil Aviation Act, 1946,
§ 19(1) ; Transport Act, 1947, § 95(1) ; Electricity Act, 1947, § 53(1) ; Gas Act,
1948, § 57(1).
53. American writers seem to have reached this conclusion long ago. Cf. KUHN,
LABOR INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS 154 et 8eq. (1956).
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1. Neither British writers 54 nor the draftsmen of the two
orders providing for compulsory arbitration have paid attention
to the distinction drawn in American literature5 and practice
between disputes as to rights and disputes as to interests.5 6 Dis-
putes as to rights are eminently arbitrable while disputes as to
interests are not, at least not unless the parties agree on a set
of principles to be applied in the making of a new agreement.
5 7
A discussion of what these principles should be is outside the
scope of this article.5 8 By endowing arbitration awards with
compulsory effect, irrespective of the subject matter of the ref-
erence the minister has created a situation which proved to be
untenable in the long run.
2. In a semi-managed economy, such as has prevailed in
Britain since the war, arbitrators dealing with interest disputes
face further difficulties. In such an economy the government
has accepted a measure of responsibility for maintaining full
employment and for curtailing inflation.59 In order to deal with
these twin objectives some control over wages is needed. From
time to time the government or individual ministers have made
pronouncements as to the kind of wage policy which should be
followed.6 0  These pronouncements are generally addressed as
54. There is a brief discussion of this question in KNOWLES, STRIKES 68-69
(1952).
55. See, e.g., BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 27 (1951);
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 17 (1952) ; Spielmans, When Stoppages Are
Prohibited, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 39 (1954).
56. The Industrial Disputes Order does, however, exclude from its definition of
"disputes" those dealing with reinstatment and with compulsory union member-
ship, presumably because the clash of interests is deemed to be too great.
57. Arbitration of interests appears to be much less common in the United
States than in British practice. Cf. SURFIN & SEDGWICK, LABOR LAW 528 (1954) ;
Ferguson, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 80 (1949).
58. As far as British conditions are concerned, such a discussion may be found
in RANKIN, ARBITRATION PRINCIPLES AND THE INDUSTRIAL COURT (1932) and
WOOTTON, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WAGE POLICY (1955). For the United
States, see, among others, BERNSTEIN, THE ARBITRATION OF WAGES (1954) ;
EmLKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 91 et seq. (1952); GITLOW, WAGE DETERMI-
NATION UNDER NATIONAL BOARDS (1953).
59. "So long as full employment lasts there are likely to be only relatively
brief periods in which the government in power can afford to ignore the infla-
tionary pressures caused by union wage demands, and it is only in these brief
periods that the Minister of Labour will be able to devote his energies entirely to
conciliation and to spreading goodwill." Shanks, New Phase in Wage Bargaining,
108 THE BANKER 151 (1958).
60. Of. the statement of the Prime Minister on personal incomes, costs, and
prices made to the House of Commons on February 4, 1948, and issued subse-
quently as Cmd. 7321. On the other hand, however, succesive Ministers of Labour
have gone out of their way to stress the independence of arbitrators. "There will
he no tampering with arbitration as long as I hold my office." Sir Walter
Monckton, Q.C., M.P. (then Minister of Labour and National Service) 522 House
of Commons Reports, col. 821 (January 19, 1954).
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exhortations to those engaged in collective bargaining, but they
can hardly be without influence on arbitrators. Now, while in
theory arbitrators are supposed to be independent of the gov-
ernment and decide each dispute solely on its merits, it is dif-
ficult for them to leave the national interest entirely out of
sight. If they are prepared to heed government warnings about
the dangers of wage inflation, they will be charged by the unions
or by the government's political opponents with having intro-
duced extraneous matter into their awards. In such circum-
stances the choice of the independent members of an arbitration
board may acquire increased importance and the burden that is
cast upon the arbitrators is one that it is not fair to expect them
to bear. While there are no binding precedents in industrial
arbitration, it is still true that in "interest disputes" where new
wage rates are at stake a certain "norm" may easily develop
from arbitration awards which will subsequently be followed in
other awards. This is why trade unions, whenever the annual
round of wage claims commences, tend to pick with great care
the industry in which the first claim is to be submitted. If this
is an industry in which the unions have a particularly good case
and the employers' resistance to their claim is likely to be a weak
one, it is then possible for other unions to demand similar in-
creases, not on the ground of capacity to pay, etc., but in order
to restore differentials which have been disturbed by the original
award.61
In order to assess the relative importance of rights disputes
and interest disputes, the author has attempted to analyze the
awards of the I.D.T. in 1953. In that year 178 awards were
made by the tribunal divided as follows:
Interest Disputes
Wage rates for an entire industry or a large section 49
Wages of workers in particular firms 35
Implementation of "recognized terms and conditions" 31
Salaries of clerical and professional workers 12
127
61. "This is the 'follow-my-leader' principle, under which arbitrators apparently
feel themselves bound to follow precedents set in other industries. This has meant,
in effect, that the pattern of wage increases throughout the economy in any given
year is determined by a single decision in a single key industry, whether reached
by negotiation or arbitration." Shanks, New Phase in Wage Bargaining, 108
THn BANKER 154 (1958).
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Rights disputes
The grading of a particular worker 16
Wage rates applicable to particular jobs 6
Interpretation of a collective agreement 3
Working conditions of particular workers 7
Conditions of employment in particular firms 14
Conditions of employment in particular industries 5
51
A closer study of the disputes concerning wage rates shows
that only two demands for increases were rejected outright and
this was due to the special circumstances prevailing in the indus-
tries involved.62 Where wage increases were awarded the
amounts appear to bear little relation to the demands made and
fall within fairly narrow limits approximating, if expressed in
percentage terms, the changes in the cost of living since the last
award or agreement. It is of course impossible to say whether
it was this fact which governed the award of the tribunal as the
tribunal gives no reasons for its decisions.
It is possible, however, to draw certain general conclusions
from the awards:
a. The awards are generally expressed as an increase of so
much per week or per hour added to the basic rate, rather than
in the form of a percentage increase. This had led to differen-
tials for skill being gradually whittled down in percentage terms.
b. Unions and employers' associations use the same argu-
ments both for supporting wage demands as well as for opposing
them. The difference between them lies entirely in their inter-
pretation of the facts. While employers, for instance, refer to
the actual changes in the cost of living index, trade unions tend
to emphasize the changes in the food section of the index, since
that section has gone up by more than the index as a whole.63
c. Trade unions tend to contrast changes in wage rates with
changes in the cost of living, while employers prefer to compare
changes in earnings with changes in the cost of living.
62. One applied to the building industry in which wages are already, by agree-
ment, subject to automatic adjustment on the sliding scale principle, while the
other referred to the cotton textile industry which in 1953 was just recovering
from a slump.
63. See note 70 infra.
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d. Trade unions have made more use of the facilities pro-
vided by the I.D.T. than employers. Of the 178 awards of the
I.D.T. made in 1953 only four resulted from disputes reported
to the minister by an employer or an employers' association.64
It is interesting to note in passing that while the trade unions
had to be persuaded in 1940 by such of their leaders as the late
Ernest Bevin to accept the principle of compulsory arbitration,
the abolition of it in 1958 was hotly opposed by the entire trade
union movement.6
3. The main reason for the dissatisfaction of employers with
compulsory arbitration has been its onesidedness. In theory,
awards of the I.D.T. are binding on both sides. If an employer
refuses to comply with an award where he has been himself a
party to the proceedings, the individual workmen employed by
him could treat this as a breach of contract. If the employer
has not been a party to the dispute reported to the minister,
there exists the possibility of the union raising his non-com-
pliance with the terms of the award as a separate "issue." If, on
the other hand, the union or its membership refuses to accept
an award, no means are available to enforce its application
against the unwilling union membership. 66 Naturally, the effec-
tiveness of compulsory arbitration would be compromised if
awards were to be frequently disregarded 7 and the suspicion
has grown that when arbitrators consider their awards they are
less concerned with the merits of the case and more with the
likelihood of the award being acceptable to the union.68 Indeed,
it has been suggested that the award is based on the estimate of
64. "The scales in arbitration are therefore heavily weighted against the em-
ployers and this has been reflected in the increasingly cavalier attitude taken to-
wards it by the unions. It is by no means unknown for unions to boycott session
of the Disputes Tribunal, or to announce in advance that they will ignore awards
which do not satisfy them." Shanks, New Phase in Wage Bargaining, 108 THE
BANKER 153 (1958).
65. Cf. the debate in the House of Commons on November 19, 1958.
66. Shanks, New Phase in Wage Bargaining, 108 THE BANKER 153 (1958).
For a similar experience in the United States consult KUHN, LABOR INSTITUTIONS
AND ECONOMICS 155 (1956).
67. "One serious difficulty which permanent boards face is that their effective-
ness may be reduced if they hand down a decision resented by one of the parties."
TAFT, ECONOMICS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR 771 (2d ed. 1948).
68. "[T]he tribunal has always had an incentive to lean a little more towards
inflation because it has laboured under the awful shadow of not knowing what on
earth it can do (apart from look silly) if a union turns down one of its 'legally
enforceable awards' and goes on strike anyway. So its constant effort has been
to make recommendations which will avoid this embarrassment." THE ECONOMIST
(London) 303-304 (October 25, 1958).
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the arbitrators as to the minimum which it would pay the union
to accept rather than to come out on strike.6 9
4. As has been pointed out already, there exists no direct
evidence as to the considerations which influence the arbitra-
tors.70 There exists, however, some indirect evidence. The re-
ports of the courts of inquiry set up from time to time by the
minister of Labour and National Service to inquire into trade
disputes contain detailed reasons for their recommendations.
The members of the courts of inquiry are generally chosen from
among the small group of persons who also are called upon to
sit as members of arbitration bodies. If we consult, for instance,
the report of the court of inquiry which investigated the wage
dispute in the engineering industry in 195471 we find there the
following statement of general principles:
"We inquired of those who appeared before us whether there
was any common ground as to the principles which guide
them when wage adjustments in the industry are under con-
sideration. From the answers that we received it seemed to us
that there was no mutually accepted formula and no ex-
pressed common assent in regard to guiding principles. At
the same time it seemed to us that there was a considerable
measure of underlying and implicit agreement. As so often
happens, difficulties arise not so much in the recognition or
statement of broad principles as in their application. For
69. "[T]he arbitrator's job is to find a settlement which the disputants can
with advantage accept." HICKS, THEORY OF WAGES 150 (1935). "Any arbitra-
tion tribunal, therefore, which sought faithfully to abide by the rule that it is only
an 'auxiliary to collective bargaining' would have to dismiss nearly all the argu-
mentation to which it has to listen as irrelevant." WOOTTON, THE SOCIAL FouN-
DATIONS OF WAGE POLICY 99 (1955). This view seems to be held also by Ameri-
can writers on arbitration. "[H]e is often obliged to consider not only the equities
shaping the issues but also the parties' relative bargaining power. If he fails to
do so, he may undermine his basic function -keeping the peace." Bernstein in
KORNHAUSER, DUBIN & Ross, INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 306 (1954). Is appeasement
really the arbitrator's basic function?
70. "Nobody who studies the awards made over the past few years by the Dis-
putes Tribunal, the Industrial Court, ad hoc courts of enquiry or any of the stand-
ing arbitration bodies for particular industries . . . can claim that they follow any
logical or consistent pattern. So far as can be seen the criteria adopted for wage
awards have been one or more of the following:
"(1) Wages have been increased by just enough to offset the rise in the retail
prices since the last awards;
"(2) Wages have been raised by the same amount as in other industries;
"(3) Wages have been increased by the difference between the original union
claim and the employers' counter-offer or, if there is no counter-offer, by
round about half the original claim." Shanks, New Phase in Wage Bar-
gaining, 108 THE BANKER 153 (1958).
71. Cmd. 9084 (1954). The chairman of the court was Lord Justice Morris and
the other members were Mr. C. J. Geddes, Sir Harold Howitt, Mr. Hugh Lloyd-
Williams and Sir Robert John Sinclair.
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example, there is no agreement that wage movements should
be linked in any way directly with movements in the cost of
living though there seemed to be general acceptance that
fluctuations in the cost of living form one element to be taken
into account in any general review. Similarly though there
are no general arrangements on the basis of profit sharing
it seems to be recognized that in any wage review the general
prosperity of the industry should be considered .... 72
The report also deals with the effect of higher wages on in-
flation and states: "to refuse, because of the perils of inflation,
to recognize the claims of those whose wage rates have relatively
to the wage rates of others materially fallen behind, would be dif-
ficult to defend. '
73
It appears from this report that the arbitrators are fully
aware of the effects on the national economy of any award
which they may make but that they feel that it is not their task
to deal with conflicting economic arguments as to the causes of
inflation and the best ways of dealing with it. Indeed, the court
of inquiry recommended that "an authoritative and impartial
body [be] appointed ... to give advice and guidance as to broad
policy and possible action." This suggestion has been taken up
and a Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes has been ap-
pointed 74 under the chairmanship of Lord Cohen 75 with Sir
Dennis Robertson 76 and Sir Harold Howitt"7 as members. The
Council has published so far two reports,78 but their conclusions
and recommendations have been severely attacked by the trade
unions as not being impartial.
If all is said and done, the fact remains that whatever prin-
ciples are adopted in interest disputes, the decision is a political
one dealing with the fair distribution of the national income.
79
72. Paragraph 110, p. 40.
73. Paragraph 111, p. 41.
74. The terms of reference read: "Having regard to the desirability of full
employment and increasing standards of life based on expanding production and
reasonable stability of prices, to keep under review changes in prices, productivity
and the level of incomes (including wages, salaries, and profits) and to report
thereon from time to time."
75. Lord Cohen is a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.
76. Sir Dennis Robertson is professor emeritus of political economy at the
University of Cambridge.
77. Sir Harold Howitt is a prominent chartered accountant.
78. The first report was published in February 1958; the second in August
1958.
79. "The question that surprisingly few people seem to ask themselves is
whether this most crucial controversy of British economic policy is really one that
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Either this decision is left entirely to the forces of the market 0
or it is made by the government in pursuance of a national wages
policy.' What is impossible in the long run is, to adapt a famous
saying, to have a wage system which is half free and half
planned and this is exactly what has happened in the United
Kingdom under the system of compulsory arbitration.
5. Two final points must be made. Compulsory arbitration
has been used as a weapon against splinter unions by depriving
them effectively of the possibility of joining in bargaining and
arbitration. Such a step is wrong in a free society. Compulsory
arbitration has also stood in the way of an extension of voluntary
collective bargaining. After all, why should the negotiators on
either side risk unpopularity with their own members if the
blame for inevitable concessions to the other side can be placed
on the broad shoulders of the arbitrators ?82
It is not easy to predict what will happen when compulsory
arbitration has gone for good. The author claims no qualities of
prophecy; all he can do is to set out the principles on which, in
his opinion, industrial arbitration should be based in Britain's
present circumstances:
1. As it is generally agreed that a collective agreement is
always preferable even to the best arbitration award, 83 collective
agreements should be made legally binding on both parties. This
might necessitate some changes in trade union law; but as this
branch of English law is already in dire need of revision, 84 this
should not prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. All disputes
ought to be decided by anything from three to five haphazardly appointed gentle-
men sitting in some arbitrational court room." Ordeal by Arbitration, THE EcoN-
OMIST (London) 749 (November 30, 1957).
80. The arbitrator may, of course, aim at an award reproducing the settlement
which, in his opinion, the parties would have reached by voluntary bargaining. Of.
BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 181 (1951). Whether this
would satisfy at least one of the parties is another question.
81. Ordeal by Arbitration, THE ECONOMIST (London) 750 (1957).
82. "[T]he existence of compulsory arbitration discourages collective bargain-
ing. The negotiating parties often hesitate to make reasonable demands or offers
or to agree to any concession during negotiations for ,fear that the other side will
be able to use counter offers as a springboard for securing a still better settle-
ment under compulsory arbitration." LESTER, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
335 (1951). See also BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 272
(1951). Australian experience also supports this conclusion. Laffer, Problem8 of
Australian Compulsory Arbitration, 77 INTERNATIONAL LABOR REV. 421 (1958).
83. "The whole basis of our industrial system is voluntary negotiation and
agreement between the two sides." Per Iain Macleod, M.P. (Minister of Labour
and National Service), 595 House of Commons Reports, col. 1172 (November 19,
1958).
84. Cf. Frank, Trade Union Law in the British Welfare State, 18 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 271 (1958).
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arising out of the application or interpretation of these agree-
ments should be compulsorily arbitrable by the Industrial Court,
whose awards would have to be made legally binding for this
purpose, except where both parties agree to accept as binding
the award of some other arbitration body.
2. As the author does not believe in a full-scale national
wages policy which would be contrary to the principle of volun-
tarism that has prevailed for so long in industrial relations in
this country, interest disputes should not be subject to com-
pulsory arbitration. Parties to such disputes should be, however,
given the opportunity of having their differences settled by arbi-
tration, provided that they are able to present to the arbitration
body terms of reference which contain some agreed statement of
principles on which the dispute may be determined.8 5
3. The principle of compulsory extension of "recognized
terms and conditions of employment" may well be maintained.
It has worked on the whole fairly well and there have been few
complaints from either side of industry.""
4. The Industrial Court as well as the Industrial Disputes
Tribunal have at present a tri-partite composition. There ap-
pears little that can be said in favor of the presence of members
representing employers and workpeople,87 and their removal
might streamline proceedings.
5. In view of the limits which have been proposed for the
types of disputes that may go to arbitration, arbitration boards
should be requested once again to give reasons for their awards.8
85. "[Elven with agreed upon points of reference the discretion of the arbi-
trator can be expected to be quite broad. 'Interests' arbitration as a part of the
collective bargaining process is essentially dynamic and fluid." ELKOURI, HOW
ARBITRATION WORKs 24 (1952).
86. The Minister of Labour and National Service in the House of Commons
debate on the abolition of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal gave a broad hint that
something would be done to retain the "issues" procedure.
87. The argument generally adduced in their favour is that they may help in
mediation. BERNSTEIN, TuE ARBITRATION OF WAGES 310 (1954). Mediation is,
however, not one of the functions of permanent arbitration bodies in the United
Kingdom. Even in the United States the tripartite system has been on the decline
in recent years. Cf. Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Apprai8al, 19 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 87 (1955).
88. This used to be the normal practice of the Industrial Court during the
early years of its existence. Its first president put the argument in favor of giving
reasons very clearly when he said: "Appeal to a tribunal which keeps its counsel
wholly to itself and announces its decision without any explanation must appear
to parties to be a speculative proceeding." AMULREE, INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION
184 (1929).
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6. Arbitration, as so many other good things of life, is most
valuable when used sparingly. 9 If we tend to overload the ma-
chinery with functions for which it is not really fitted it is
bound to break down completely and that would be more harmful
to industrial peace in the long run than any partial and voluntary
curtailment of the use of arbitration. 90
89. Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Appraisal, 9 Iin. & LAB. REL. REV.
90 (1955).
90. "[C]ompulsory arbitration should not be regarded or relied upon as the
final solution of the industrial problem of the country. It should be contemplated
rather as being in the nature of a halfway house or accommodation on the road
to an ultimate full freedom of genuine collective bargaining." Foenander, The
Achievement and Significance of Industrial Regulation in Australia, 75 INTEqNA-
flONAL LABOUR REV. 116-17 (1957).
